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Abstract: Compression is a fundamental goal of both human language and digital communication,
yet natural language is very different from compression schemes employed by modern computers. We
partly explain this difference using the fact that information theory generally assumes a common prior
probability distribution shared by the encoder and decoder, whereas human communication has to be
robust to the fact that a speaker and listener may have different prior beliefs about what a speaker may
say. We model this information-theoretically using the following question: what type of compression
scheme would be effective when the encoder and decoder have (boundedly) different prior probability
distributions. The resulting compression scheme resembles natural language to a far greater extent than
existing digital communication protocols. We also use information theory to justify why ambiguity is
necessary for the purpose of compression.
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Introduction

Natural language is ambiguous. One sentence
could mean a variety of things in different conIt is well-known that information theory sheds
texts. At first thought, it is not clear that ambiguity
light on natural language in the following sense.
serves any purpose, and communication may seem
Common words, such as “as” and “and” tend
best when everything has the precision of mathto be shorter than less frequent words such as
ematics with (ideally) exactly one interpretation.
“biomimicry.” In this paper, we aim to strengthen
On such grounds, Wasow et al. (2005) call the exthe connection between information theory and
istence of ambiguity in language surprising, and
the study of human communication. First, we
moreover, note that the relative lack of work or inpoint out that information theory justifies ambiguterest in the ambiguity of language by linguists is
ity, pervasive in natural language, by showing that
also surprising. Cohen (2006) discusses the varit is necessary for efficient compression. Second,
ious theories proposed for why language is amwe design a compression scheme that bears a rebiguous, but he concludes, “As far as I can see,
semblance to natural language, to an extent well
the reason for the ambiguity of language remains a
beyond that of existing compression and errorpuzzle we simply don’t know why language is amcorrecting schemes. Unlike standard compression
biguous.” According to Chomsky (2008), ambischemes, it is robust to variations in the prior probguity illustrates that natural language was “poorly
ability distribution between sender and receiver.
designed for communicative efficiency.”
∗ Supported
† Supported

by NSF award CCF-0939370.
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speculates that the primary purpose of ambiguity in language is not for succinct communication
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but for, “minimizing the complexity of rule systems.”
However, it is easy to justify ambiguity to anyone who is familiar with information theory. Typical sentences, such as, Alice said that Bob lied
to Eve, are ambiguous but shorter than clearer alternatives.1 In context, the intended meaning is
often clear, and hence shorter communication is
preferred. This is exactly what information theory predicts – optimal compression is possible
when there is a known prior probability distribution, p, over what is to be communicated. The
common prior shared by a pair of communicating parties may be viewed as the shared context
between them. The following manner of communicating would be essentially optimal in terms of
minimizing expected communication length. For
any natural number, n, a speaker who had in mind
a certain thought would say n and mean the nth
most likely thought according to our shared prior
distribution.
Two problems with the above compression
scheme stand out. First, it is very brittle in the
sense that if the speaker and listener have even
slightly different priors, every transmission may
be completely erroneous. (This is true of Huffman coding as well.) Second, it clearly does not
resemble human communication of any form. We
show that these two problems are related by giving
a compression scheme which is (a) robust to differences in priors, and (b) resembles human language.

ceivers recover the intended message, and (b) minimize the encoding length.
The sender has a prior probability distribution,
p over messages. This prior distribution is determined by the context in which the discussion takes
place, and to some extent the speaker’s knowledge
and all of her own experiences. The sender also
chooses a parameter α ≥ 1 reflecting how broad
an audience to whom her communication must be
clear. For example, if the sender is writing a paper for people within her community, she would
choose a smaller α then if she were writing for an
interdisciplinary audience. The receiver has a potentially different prior distribution, q. The communication will be clear as long as q is within an α
factor of p, i.e., α1 p(m) ≤ q(m) ≤ αp(m) for all
messages m.

Figure 1 depicts an underlying a bipartite graph
between messages and encodings. This graph can
be viewed as a dictionary: for each encoding it
specifies a set of possible messages (meanings). It
is assumed that this underlying graph (we postpone
describing how it is chosen) is commonly known
to both people and serves roughly the same purpose as a language. The receiver’s decoding procedure is natural: given a received encoding, he
chooses the most likely compatible message according to his distribution, i.e., the message most
likely under q which has an edge to the received
encoding. The sender, assuming that q is within
a factor of α of p, chooses a minimal-length encoding that will guarantee correct decoding for all
1.1 The scheme and similarity to human such q. This amounts to being the shortest endisambiguation
coding where the intended message has a signifiWe consider one-way (non-interactive) commu- cantly higher (α2 factor) probability than any annication, in which there is a set of messages, rep- other possible interpretation.
resenting what the sender would like to commuThe bipartite graph (i.e., dictionary) is chosen
nicate (an idea, the true intended meaning of the based upon some parameters. We give two instancommunication). There is also a set of encod- tiations. The first is simpler but has infinitely many
ings, which represent the actual communication. parameters. The second is based upon universal
For simplicity, we may think of the encoding as a hash functions and has parameters that require a
single written sentence, but it could equally be an number of bits which is logarithmic in the numemail, an elaborate hand gesture, or an utterance of ber of messages. This mirrors the Principles and
arbitrary length. Some encodings are longer than Parameters Theory of linguistics (see, e.g., Chomothers, and it is desirable to (a) ensure that the re- sky and Lansik, 1993), which states that a small
number of parameters characterize each language.
1 The sentence Alice said, “Bob lied to Eve” implies a diIn natural language, it would be infeasible to print
rect quotation and therefore has a different meaning than the
intended, Alice said something to someone, and that something a “sentence dictionary” of what every sentence or
document might mean in any context. However,
was that Bob lied to Eve.
2
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Figure 1: In our compression schemes, there is a common-knowledge “dictionary,” a bipartite graph connecting
encodings to possible messages. The messages, on the left side, are the possible ideas that the sender may wish to
convey. The right side has each possible encoding, e.g., written sentences, longer units of text, or any other form of
communication across a medium. Each person has a private prior distribution over messages. The bipartite graph
has an edge between an encoding and each meaning that it might plausibly represent. In our scheme, the decoder
simply chooses the most likely message that is adjacent to the transmitted encoding, according to the receivers prior.
The sender chooses the shortest encoding which is guaranteed to be correctly decoded.

such a mapping is, to some extent, implicitly computable in people’s mind. People would largely
agree that the sentence Alice said that Bob lied to
Eve could mean that Alice said that (Bob lied to
Eve) or that Alice told Eve that Bob lied. Of course,
there will never be perfect agreement on the complete set of possibilities, just as different dictionaries do not agree on definitions or even the set
of legal words. In this example, some may argue
that, in the above, Alice might be indicating that
Bob was lying (on a bed, perhaps), and avoided the
grammatically correct version: Alice said that Bob
lay to Eve. While there will always be gray areas
and exceptions to most linguistic rules, to a first
approximation this dictionary model of language
is more faithful than either of the two extremes:
each sentence has exactly one interpretation (like
an ideal computer programming language), or any
sentence can mean anything in the right context (as
in compression schemes such as Huffman coding).

mean. Conversely, it is the speaker’s duty to communicate in such a manner that any listener in her
audience will believe that the intended message is
the most likely interpretation of what is said. And
of course it is ambiguous – a certain encoding may
be decoded differently depending on the decoder’s
prior (context). Furthermore, these properties arise
naturally out of a mathematical goal of provable
efficiency in encoding length.
Finally, we also mention a technique whereby
one can reduce the dictionary size. This pruning
step only leads to a slight improvement in efficiency. However it also resembles an effect that
occurs in language. It takes advantage of the fact
that a speaker would not normally use an unnecessarily complicated expression for a simple idea
that could be described in a shorter unambiguous
fashion. In mathematics, consider the two definitions,

We feel that this procedure also resembles human language both in terms of listening and speaking, or at least to a greater extent than existing
compression schemes. In terms of disambiguation, it seems natural for a listener to take the most
likely plausible interpretation in the “dictionary,”
under his prior over what he expects the speaker to

. X
H(p) =
p(x) log 1/p(x)
x

.
f (x) = log x/x
Here, mathematically sophisticated readers
will naturally interpret log 1/p(x) as meaning
log(1/p(x)) rather than log(1)/p(x) = 0. On the
3

other hand, the log x/x will be log(x)/x rather
than log(x/x) = 0. In both cases, the listener is
performing higher-order reasoning. In particular,
the listener would have expected a simpler, unam.
biguous definition, like f (x) = 0, if the intended
meaning were 0. While the savings in communication is modest, such short-cuts are regularly used
by mathematicians, who generally have a strong
desire to avoid ambiguity. For an English example, consider the example of sentence, You may
step forward when your number is called. The implication is that you may not step forward before
your number is called, for if that was not the intention, the sentence You may step forward at any
time could have been used.

son (2000), they strongly agree on these points.
The difference in our work is that while on the
one hand we make no promises about being able to
account for vast ranges of phenomena like Levinson or Sperber and Wilson do, on the other hand
we show that effects like conversational implicature can arise from surprisingly minimial and uncontroversial considerations. Indeed, our model
is consistent with the premises laid out by Sperber and Wilson prior to the point where they begin speculating about cognitive architectures, and
is arguably “more obvious” (in hindsight) than the
model they end up with.2

1.2

Interpretation and applications

Designing and recognizing the similarity between nature and engineering informs our understanding of both. Consider, for example, the striking similarity between the camera and human eye.
These similarities suggest that certain aspects of
the eye are not artifacts of poor evolution, but instead may serve a purpose. In the same way as
connections between photography and human vision deepen our understanding, we hope that robust compression schemes may help connect information theory and the study of human communication.
Second, there may be situations where two computer systems need to communicate in a compressed fashion, but they do not share exactly the
same prior. Consider, for example, a computer
compressing a document to be sent to a printers.
Now, a fixed compression scheme could be agreed
upon in advance. However, for compatibility reasons, this compression scheme would remain fixed
for many years, and it may become poorly suited
for a certain category of documents that emerge
years later. For example, if many people started
printing many documents with the same fixed logo
on it, the computers and printers may adapt.
The idea here is that computers and printers
could learn and periodically update their priors

Such instances where listeners use higher-order
reasoning to determine a meaning of an utterance
beyond what the utterance literally suggests were
first studied by Grice (1975), who called this process “conversational implicature.” In Grice’s theory, he put forward the cooperative principle that
supposed that speakers adhered to a list of maxims – including, “Make your contribution as informative as required” and “Be brief (avoid unneccessary prolixity),” among many others – and
he argued that listeners will logically infer the
speaker’s true meaning by taking the speaker’s
adherence to these maxims as axioms. Grice’s
maxims were subsequently reformulated into a
few more coherent principles by numerous authors
(Levinson (2000) gives a nice summary). Our
model suggests a simpler alternative account of
many instances of conversational implicature: the
speaker simply says as little as possible to overcome the disagreement with the listener’s prior,
trusting the listener to reason that any other (unintended) likely meanings would have had shorter
expressions, e.g., as done by our second decoding
scheme.
Other authors have noticed that conversational implicature might arise from the desire to
communicate more efficiently—Sperber and Wilson (1995) in particular dwell on this point; conversely, many authors also noticed that conversational implicatures might be closely related to ambiguity, specifically that they might exist for similar reasons and employ similar mechanisms. Indeed, for all the bitter disagreements that appear
to exist between Sperber and Wilson and Levin-

2

Although the model presented by Sperber and Wilson (1995)
is rather informal, the formalizations based on information theory presented by, e.g., Blutner (1998), and formalizations based
on game theory presented by, e.g., Parikh (1992), Merin (1997),
and van Rooy (2001) naturally end up being on the one hand
more intricate, but again, on the other hand are intended to deal
with a wider range of effects, and therefore generally incomparable.
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based on the documents they transmit, so that they
may continue to compress well under changing environment. The following modification here may
be useful. Suppose there is a simple way to verify
if the correct document was reconstructed, which
may be achieved by a checksum or more elaborate mechanism. Then notice that the parameter
α can be tuned adaptively: communication with
a smaller α may be attempted first, and if that
fails, a retry with a larger α may be used, and
so forth. Such a system would be adaptive in the
sense that, years down the road, any computer and
printer employing this protocol could communicate succinctly, even if they had never previously
encountered each other, with a logarithmic overhead in terms of how different the documents they
had seen were. This type of copying nature for engineering purposes has been recently popularized
under the term biomimicry.

algebraic codes that we have not described, are
clearly poorly suited for human communication.
Other prior work has also explored communication in the setting where the sender and receiver
are somehow different. For instance, Juba and Sudan (2008) and Goldreich, Juba and Sudan (2009)
considered how interacting pairs may achieve certain goals that can be achieved only by communication. Our work, while inspired by such work, is
different in several aspects: It focusses on a different objective, namely to reduce the number of
bits used to communicate the message. Also, we
focus on the non-interactive setting, and the quantitative bit-efficiency of our protocol is central to
our quest. Finally, our goal is to capture phenomena that may explain some of the apparent artifacts
of natural language.

1.3

There is a set of expressions which we denote by
X, and a set of meanings which we denote by M .
We assume that M is finite or countably infinite
and, for clarity, we take X = {0, 1}∗ .3 A context
provides a probability distribution over meanings,
and ∆(M ) denotes the set of probability distributions over M .
We assume that the encoding scheme and decoding scheme may share a common parameter
θ ∈ Θ, chosen from some probability distribution
µ. In our schemes, this parameter corresponds to
the aforementioned bipartite graph. An encoder
is a function, E : M × ∆(M ) × Θ → X, written Eθ (m, p), from meanings to expressions. Similarly, a decoder D : X × ∆(M ) × Θ → M ,
written Dθ (m, p), is a function from expressions
and contexts to meanings. Note that the parameter θ is chosen without regard to p or q. When θ
is clear from context, we will write E(m, p) and
D(x, q). A randomized compression scheme is a
sextuple (X, M, Θ, E, D, µ), where µ is a probability distribution over Θ. Two probability distributions, p, q ∈ ∆(M ) are called α-close, for ambiguity parameter α ≥ 1, if p(m) ≤ αq(m) and
q(m) ≤ αp(m) for all m ∈ M .

2

Related work

In recent independent work, Piantadosi et al
(2010) justify ambiguity in natural language as we
do by an information-theoretic argument, but do
not enter into the realm of different priors. A similar technical question about compressing with different priors, arises in recent independent work by
Braverman and Rao (2010). The focus of their
work is attaining optimal bounds for reducing interactive communication complexity, rather than
modeling human communication. A related notion, the quantity relative entropy, answers the following question. When two parties communicate
using a protocol designed for common prior q, how
long will messages be when the encoder actually
chooses them from p? In this case, the encoder
must know q exactly, which is unrealistic in many
settings.
Universal compression schemes, such as the
Lempel-Ziv (1978) scheme, compress without
knowledge or dependence on a prior, so it is universal for all sources. Asymptotically optimal
compression is guaranteed for ergodic sources,
e.g., those generated by small state Markov chain.
However, any such prior-free encoding will fail to
take advantage of the rich shared knowledge base
that enables two parties to communicate a significant amount of information in a short document or
even a single sentence. In short, existing compression schemes, including Huffman, Lempel-Ziv, or

Formal model

Definition 1. A randomized compression scheme
is called α-robust if for any α-close pair, (p, q) and
3 While we recognize that set of all finite binary strings is
clearly different than the richly-structured sets used in real language, our choice of X will suffice to make our main points.
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any m ∈ M , Prθ∼µ [Dθ (Eθ (m, p), q) = m] = 1.
The entropy of the scheme (on p) is defined to be
Eθ∼µ,m∼p [|Eθ (m, p)|].
Observation 1. For any α > 1, and uniformly
(i)
random rm ∈ {0, 1}i , the compression scheme is
Note that it typically suffices to describe a deα-robust. For any p ∈ ∆(M ), its entropy is at
coding procedure D(x, q) since the optimal matchmost H(p) + 2 lg(α) + 2.
ing compression function E(m, p) simply selects
the shortest string x such that D(x, q) = m for all
In the above, H(p) is the standard enq that are α-close to p. (Recall that the encoder is tropy of probability distribution p, defined by
P
assumed to know α in advance.)
m p(m) lg 1/p(m).

3

Proof. The correctness of decoding follows from
the fact that for any α-close p and q, if p(m) >
α2 p(m0 ) then q(m) ≥ p(m)/α > αp(m0 ) ≥
q(m0 ). With probability 1, there will be such an
i that p(m) > α2 p(m0 ) for all messages m0 where
(i)
(i)
rm = rm0 . So with probability 1, the message that
was encoded is necessarily the most likely m ∈ S
for decoding.
It suffices to show that the expected encoding
length of a message m is at most lg(α2 /p(m)) +
2. To see this, note that there are less than
α2 /p(m) messages, different from m, with probability at least p(m)/α2 . Call this set T and
let s = |T | < α2 /p(m). Consider the probability that any other message m0 ∈ T collides
(i)
(i)
with m on the i-bit encoding (rm = rm0 ). For
i = dlg(s)e + k, by the union bound, this probability is at most s2−(lg(s)+k) ≤ 2−k . Using the
fact that for any nonnegative
integer random variP∞
able V , E[V ] =
Pr[V
≥ i], we have that
i=1
the expected
number
of
bits
in
common is at most
P∞
dlg(s)e + k=0 2−k ≤ lg(s) + 2.

Our compression scheme

In this compression scheme, we assume that the
encoder and decoder share a common infinite pa(i)
(i)
i
rameter sequence hrm i∞
i=1 , where rm ∈ {0, 1}
for each m ∈ M , chosen uniformly at random
and independently. In other words, for each message and each length i = 1, 2, . . ., an independent random binary string of length i is chosen and
shared between the encoder and decoder.4 This determines a bipartite graph between messages and
(i)
{0, 1}∗ by connecting each message m to rm , for
each i. As mentioned, this is similar to a dictionary. In section 6, we give a more practical scheme
that requires a number of random bits that is logarithmic in the number of messages.
On encoding x of length i = |x|, the decoder
chooses the most likely message m (that of greatest
(i)
q(m)) among those messages such that rm = x.
Formally, the scheme is as follows.
Compression scheme. The encoding algorithm
and decoding algorithm share randomness, namely
(i)
infinite sequences of random strings θ = hrm i∞
i=1 .
To encode m ∈ M :
(i)
• Send rm where i is the smallest natural number such that: p(m) > α2 p(m0 ) for all mes(i)
(i)
sages m0 where rm = rm0 .5
∗
To decode x ∈ {0, 1} :
(i)
• Let i = |x| and S = {m ∈ M | rm = x}.
Output arg maxm∈S q(m).6

It is not difficult to show that no α-robust
scheme can achieve entropy better than H(p) +
lg(α) for all p. On the other hand, we show below that there exist distributions for which the entropy bound achieved by our scheme is H(p)+(2−
o(1)) lg(α) (i.e. our analysis is essentially tight).
Claim 1. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists a distribution p and an α = α(ε) such that the entropy of the above compression scheme is at least
H(p) + (2 − ε) lg α.

4 For simplicity, the algorithms are described using infinitely
many random bits. More practical versions are possible.
5 In the (zero probability) event where there is no such number, send 0.
6 To formally define D, we must define how the decoding
scheme behaves if there is not a unique maximum (or S = ∅).
In this case, we could designate a fixed message m0 and output
that message.

2

Proof. Fix k = d3/εe, and α = 2k . Now consider a distribution p defined as follows: for each
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, the distribution p contains α2i
messages that each have probability 1/kα2i . Then
6

5
H(p) =

1
k

k
X

!
lg(kα2i )

= (k + 1) lg α + lg k.

If a message m has a unique encoding of length
i, then it seems unnecessary to disambiguate between m and other messages on encodings of
length greater than i. This idea can be used to decrease the number of edges in the bipartite graph
as well as average number of bits communicated.
(i)
Given parameter vector θ = hrm i∞
i=1 , where
(i)
i
rm ∈ {0, 1} for each m ∈ M , we choose the fol(i)
lowing pruned vector θ̂ = hr̂m i∞
i=1 , constructed
as follows. Define M1 = M and,

i=1

On the other hand, the entropy of the compression scheme is bounded from below by,
1
k

k−1
X

!
lg(α2i+2 ) + lg(α2k )

=

i=1

(k + 1) lg α+2 lg α −

2 lg α
.
k

Since (2 lg α)/k + lg k ≤ ε lg α for our choice
k and α, the claim follows.

Mi+1 = {m ∈ Mi | ∃m0 ∈ Mi s.t. m0 6= m

An interesting question is if there is a compression scheme that matches the H(p) + lg(α) bound.

4

Higher-order disambiguation and
pruning the dictionary

(i)

(i)
and rm
= rm0 }.

Mi are the set of messages that do not have a
completely unambiguous encoding of length less
than i. Finally, for each m and i, set,
(
(i)
if m ∈ Mi
rm
(i)
r̂m =
−1 otherwise.

The need for ambiguity

In this section, we show that any unambiguous
compression scheme requires many bits to communicate. This holds even for nonrobust communication, i.e., for α=1. Formally, say an encoder
is unambiguous if for all θ ∈ Θ, m, m0 ∈ M ,
In other words, a message which has a unamand p, p0 ∈ ∆(M ), if Eθ (m, p) = Eθ (m0 , p0 ) then biguous encoding of length i will be not have any
m = m0 . Define the dirac probability distribution encodings of greater length.
δm by δm (m) = 1 and δm (m0 ) = 0 for m0 6= m.
Observation 3. For any α > 1, our compression
Observation 2. For any unambiguous encoder on scheme using r̂ instead of r is α-robust and has
finite message set M , there is a message
 m such entropy no greater than the entropy when using r.
that δm has expected entropy of lg |M | − 1.
There are probability distributions p for which it
Hence, the trivial encoding scheme of encod- has strictly lower entropy.
ing each message by a unique length-lg M biAs can be seen from the proof below,
nary string, independent of p, is essentially opti“most” nontrivial probability distributions will
mal even for probability distributions δm , where
have strictly lower entropy in the higher order
H(δm ) = 0.
scheme.
Proof. Note that for any θ, the function f (m) =
Eθ (m, δm ) is injective.
Hence, by a stan- Proof. The proof of α-robustness is exactly the
dard counting argument, for any
fixed θ, same as in the first case. Clearly, the encoding of

Em∈U M [ |Eθ (m, δm )| ] ≥ lg |M | − 1, where any message cannot be longer than that of the secthe expectation of is taken over uniformly random ond compression scheme, if the two share the same
random strings. Finally, take three messages M =
m ∈ M . Thus
{a, b, c} and p(a) = p(b) = p(c) = 1/3. With
(1)
(1)
(1)
positive probability, ra = 0, rb = rc = 1,

(2)
(2)
(2)
Em∈U M,θ∼µ [ |Eθ (m, δm )| ] ≥ lg |M | − 1.
ra = rb = 00, and rc = 01. In this case,
the compression scheme encodes b by a string
Hence, there exists some message
m
such
that

Eθ∼µ [ |Eθ (m, δm )| ] ≥ lg |M | − 1, as is claimed. of length greater than 2 while the higher-order
scheme encode b by 00.
7
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(am+b) (mod π) 6= (am0 +b) (mod π), and (ii)
((am + b) (mod π), (am0 + b) (mod π)) range
over all possible π(π − 1) pairs of values. Thus
over random choice of a, b, for any i ≤ ` + 1, we
(i)
(i)
have that Pr[rm = rm0 ] ≤ 2−i . Hence for i =
dlg(s)e + k, by the union bound, the probability
that any message inT agrees with m on i bits is at
most s 2−(lg(s)+k) ≤ 2−k . As before, using the
fact that for any nonnegative integer random variP`+1
able V ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `+1}, E[V ] = i=1 Pr[V ≥
i], we have that the expected encoding length is at

P`
most dlg(s)e + k=0 2−k ≤ lg(s) + 2.

Using fewer random bits

As stated, our compression scheme requires infinite randomness, for finite message spaces, M .
We now give a variation with O(log(|M |)) random bits, using Universal Hash Functions (Carter,
and Wegman, 1979). Again, we do not change
the compression scheme but simply the dictionary,
i.e., we apply the compression scheme described
(i)
earlier with a different hrm i.
We assume w.l.o.g. that each message corresponds to an `-bit string where ` = dlog(M + 1)e,
that is, m ∈ {0, 1}` . Let π be any prime in the
interval [2` , 2`+1 ) (it exists by Bertrand’s postulate). The language will have a pair a, b of random parameters where a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , π − 1}, and
b ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , π − 1}. We view each message
m as an integer in {0, 1, . . . , 2` − 1}, and define,

Thus O(log |M |) random bits suffice.
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Conclusions

We have shown that ambiguity is necessary


for
compression, and that a natural variation on
i

 (am + b)(mod π) (mod 2 ) if i ≤ `
Shannon-type
of communication leads to robust
(i)
rm
= m
if i = ` + 1 compression schemes that are more similar to how


−1
if i > ` + 1 humans communicate. The case of α = 1 corresponds to classical compression with a comObservation 4. Let a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , π − 1} and mon prior. In this case, for Shannon’s fundab ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , π − 1} be chosen uniformly at mental question of how many bits are required
random. Then the compression scheme with r as to compress a message from a single distribution,
defined above is α-robust and, for any p ∈ ∆(M ), the beautiful answer is Huffman coding (Huffman,
has expected entropy H(p) + 2 lg α + 2.
1952). However Huffman coding is not robust to
different priors. It is not even clear what metric
Proof. By construction, every message has a dif- should be used to judge optimality with respect to
(`+1)
ferent rm , hence no message will require robust compression.
more than ` + 1 bits to encode and the protoSecond, our model is unrealistic in many ways.
col is α-robust. It suffices to show that the ex- For example, the encoder must choose a single α
pected encoding length of a message m is at most and is required to be precise to all α-close priors.
lg(α2 /p(m)) + 2.
In some cases, an encoder may consider some misTo see this, again note that there are less than interpretations to be more “costly” than others, i.e.,
α2 /p(m) messages, different from m, that have there may be a cost function c : M × M → R+
probability at least p(m)/α2 . Call this set T and (c(m, m0 ) is the cost of interpreting message m to
let s = |T | < α2 /p(m). Notice that a fixed be m0 , and c(m, m) = 0), and an encoder choosm0 ∈ T collides with m on the i-bit encoding, ing amongst ambiguities may wish to avoid cer(i)
(i)
when rm = rm0 which happens iff (am + b) tain mistakes. For example, the sentence, he is a
(mod π) and (am0 + b) (mod π) agree on the last tireless student and brilliant researcher, could poi bits. So the collisions are correlated, and in par- tentially mean he is a tireless student, and he is
(i)
ticular any two messages will collide on rm for a great researcher or he is a tireless student, and
i = 1, 2, . . . , up to the number of trailing bits he is a tireless great researcher, but a confusion
that they agree on. A simple and standard ar- would not be serious. On the other hand, the sengument shows that for any pair of distinct mes- tence, you would be lucky to get him to work for
sages m, m0 , as a ranges over {1, 2, . . . , π − 1} you is ambiguous and the difference in meaning is
and b ranges over {0, 1, 2, . . . , π − 1}, we have (i) very important.
8

Finally, we have not considered computational
efficiency. Day to day, it does not seem that computational limitations are the cause of most failures to communicate. However, there are some
sentences that are notoriously difficult to parse,
called garden path sentences, such as the classic sentence, The horse raced past the barn fell.
Similarly, riddles are computationally challenging to solve. It would be very interesting to design computationally-efficient robust compression
schemes.
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